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FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN WASHINGTON-
A DEAD ISSUE?
PHILIP A. TRAUTM.AN*
The Washington Supreme Court in the recent case of Lansverk v.
Studebaker-Packard Corp.' held the doctrine of forum non conveniens
not to be a part of the law of this state. Probably as good a description
of the doctrine as can be found is set forth in the Lansverk case, name-
ly, that although a court in which a transitory action is commenced has
jurisdiction to hear and determine it, the court can, nonetheless, in its
discretion decline to exercise its jurisdiction and dismiss the action
whenever it appears that there is another forum available where trial
will best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice.
The result of the holding is that the superior courts of Washington do
not possess such discretionary power.
Several questions may be posed as a result of this decision. Will the
superior courts in the future be able to reach the same results without
referring to the doctrine by name as they would by application of the
doctrine? Will the supreme court be willing to recede in future cases
from the position it has taken? If not, should action be taken in terms
of a rule of court or a statute to implement the doctrine? In short, is
the doctrine of forum non conveniens now a dead issue in the state of
Washington?
In the Lansverk case the plaintiffs, residents of North Dakota,
brought an action against a foreign corporation, licensed to do business
in Washington, but engaged primarily in the business of manufacturing
automobiles in Indiana. The plaintiffs sought to recover for injuries
sustained by the plaintiff wife as a result of a fall while visiting the
defendant's plant in Indiana and for failure to properly diagnose and
treat the injury. The defendant was properly served with process in
Washington and was conceded to be subject to the jurisdiction of the
superior court. The defendant moved for dismissal on the ground of
forum non conveniens, which motion was granted by the lower court.
As indicated, the supreme court reversed.
In reaching its conclusion the court stated that there was nothing
in the constitution, statutes, rules, or decisions in this state that recog-
nized the existence of any discretion in the superior courts to decline
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1 154 Wash. Dec. 114, 338 P.2d 747 (1959).
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to exercise jurisdiction, vested by the constitution or statutes, by appli-
cation of the doctrine. This statement necessitates an examination of
several earlier decisions.
Two such earlier cases were discussed in the opinion. In Smith v.
Empire State-Idaho Mining & Dev. Co.' an action was commenced in
a superior court of Washington by citizens and residents of Idaho
against a corporation, organized and existing under the laws of New
York, engaged in operating a mine in Idaho, and with its principal
office and place of business in Washington. The plaintiffs sought to
recover damages for a death which resulted from an accidental injury
to an employee of the defendant while working in the mine in Idaho.
The action was subsequently removed to a federal court in Washington
on the basis of diversity of citizenship. A motion was made to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that by maintaining its
principal office in Washington the defendant corporation had con-
sented to suit in this state and that service of process had been proper
under the Washington statutes. Thus there was jurisdiction.
The holding did not reach the issue of whether, granting there was
jurisdiction, the courts of Washington had discretion to refuse to exer-
cise it. It is true that the court said, "the jurisdiction does not rest upon
comity, but upon the positive provisions of law. Therefore the court has
no discretionary power to refuse to take cognizance of the case." How-
ever, this was dictum. Moreover, the court indicated that it would be
better if the action were litigated in the state where the accident oc-
curred and the plaintiffs resided since the witnesses to the accident
resided there and could be compelled to appear and testify. This would
be less inconvenient to the witnesses and less expensive to the parties.
This perhaps suggests that if actually confronted with the problem by
proper motion, jurisdiction might have been declined. At most, the case
is inconclusive on the point.
The other decision discussed in the Lansverk case is Reynolds v.
Day.' This case held only that the Washington court had jurisdiction
to hear a transitory action for personal injuries accruing in another
state, when personal service was had in Washington. Again, the hold-
ing did not reach the issue of whether the superior court had discretion
to decline to exercise jurisdiction, though it was said that the expense
to taxpayers and the inconvenience to the courts of hearing cases aris-
2127 Fed. 462 (1904).
3 79 Wash. 499, 140 Pac. 681 (1914).
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ing in other states was not a valid objection to the exercise of juris-
diction.
In neither case then did the court have to resolve the problem of the
existence of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. As recognized in the
Lansverk case, neither could be taken as direct authority for conclud-
ing that the superior courts of the state lacked the discretionary power
embodied in the doctrine.'
In several cases, however, not mentioned in the Lansverk opinion,
the court has indicated that some discretionary power does exist,
though the doctrine of forum non conveniens has not been applied by
name. In Olympia Mining & Milling Co. v. Kerns,' an action was initi-
ated by an Idaho corporation against a resident of Idaho on a contract
made and to be performed in Idaho. The action involved the title and
possession of mining claims in Idaho. The superior court held that there
was jurisdiction over the defendant, but that it had discretion whether
to hear the case. Exercising that discretion, the lower court concluded
it should not entertain jurisdiction, but rather the parties should be
left to adjudicate their rights in Idaho. The supreme court affirmed.
The reason for the affirmance is not absolutely clear. In part, the opin-
ion seems to rest on the proposition that the Washington court had no
jurisdiction to determine title to Idaho land. The court also stated,
however, "the subject-matter of the action being situate in, and the
parties being domiciled or resident within, the state of Idaho, we take
it that it will require no argument to sustain the proposition that the
jurisdiction of our courts cannot be invoked as a matter of right, but
rests in the doctrine of comity. That a court may refuse to entertain
jurisdiction where the parties are nonresidents and the cause of action
originated and is to be performed beyond the limits of the state, is well
established." Though the court spoke in terms of comity, there seemed
to be a recognition of a discretionary power in the superior court, com-
parable to the doctrine of forum non conveniens.6
4 Other cases of like import which were concerned with the presence or lack of
jurisdiction rather than the doctrine of forum non conveniens are Gerson v. Sussman,
176 Wash. 567, 30 P.2d 379 (1934); Oregon Mortgage Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
122 Wash. 183, 210 Pac. 385 (1922); Grant v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 22 Wn.2d
65, 154 P.2d 301 (1944) ; Davis v. Harris & Co., 25 Wn.2d 664, 171 P.2d 1016 (1946).
The latter two cases recognize the principle that the courts of this state will not exer-
cise jurisdiction if an action is based upon a statute of another state and by the terms
of the statute the right given is to be enforced by prescribed proceedings within the
state of its enactment, the remedy so provided being exclusive.
5 64 Wash. 545, 117 Pac. 260 (1911).
6 See Smith v. Fletcher, 102 Wash. 218, 173 Pac. 19 (1918) for an interpretation
of the meaning of the Kerns case.
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A case which definitely recognized the doctrine is In re Yarbrough's
Estate." The facts were summarized by the court as follows: X, a citi-
zen of the state of Oregon, died there, leaving no property, but a right
in his estate to begin suit for his death against an Oregon corporation,
whose wrongful act occurred in Oregon, the suit to be governed and
the proceeds to be distributed according to the laws of Oregon. A few
months later, Z, a stranger, applied in the state of Washington for let-
ters of administration, under a law which permitted administration
where there was property of the deceased.
The question posed by the court was whether the courts of this state
had jurisdiction to appoint an administratrix. The court first stated that
the wrongful death action could not be brought until an administration
had been granted in Oregon. But the court went on to say that the
decision could better be rested on the ground that to allow the proceed-
ing was so liable to abuse and confusion that the parties would not be
allowed the use of the state's probate courts.
The court quoted with approval the following statement from a New
York case:
The habit of importing such litigations as this into this jurisdiction,
consuming the time of the courts, and requiring the people of the state
of New York to bear the burden and expense of trying actions which
ought to have been brought in other jurisdictions, where the home
courts of litigants are open to afford adequate remedies, has become a
great abuse and a just subject of complaint and protest. If it is to be
encouraged ... the flood gates of litigation in similar cases will be wide
open, if not to establish a new legal industry, at all events to impose
upon our already overworked courts the obligation to try actions im-
ported from foreign jurisdictions....
Thus, while the court posed the question in terms of lack or presence
of jurisdiction, it relied upon forum non conveniens without applying
that label."
There have been other cases in which the court has indicated that the
doctrine was part of the law of this state. In Hunter v. Wenatchee
Land Co? an action was initiated by residents of Minnesota against a
corporation doing business in Minnesota concerning a contract made in
126 Wash. 85, 216 Pac. 889 (1923).8 The Yarbrough case is discussed in In re Ludwig's Estate, 49 Wn.2d 312, 301 P.2d
158 (1956), and In re Waldrep's Estate, 49 Wn.2d 711, 306 P.2d 213 (1957). In either
instance is the language in the quotation set forth above disapproved. In fact, in the
Waldrep case it is again quoted with approval. See Samuelson, Administrators-Right
to Sue Under Foreign Wrongful Death Statute, 32 WAsH. L. REv. 70 (1957).
9 36 Wash. 541, 79 Pac. 40 (1905).
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Minnesota, whereby plaintiffs were made the exclusive sales agents of
Washington land. The court conceded the general rule was that if it
appeared that an action was brought by an alien, with alien apparently
meaning a nonresident of the place of suit, for the purpose of obtaining
any undue advantage in that jurisdiction, the courts would not lend
themselves to the investigation and determination of such a case. The
defendant contended that such an advantage was sought in the immedi-
ate case in that the laws of Minnesota would preclude recovery by the
plaintiff whereas the laws of Washington might not and further that all
the witnesses were in Minnesota. The Washington court answered this
by saying that no burden would be imposed upon the defendant since
the laws of Minnesota, that being the place of making of the contract,
would govern in the Washington suit and since the action depended
mostly upon the construction of legal documents rather than the testi-
mony of witneses. Further, the property which was the subject of the
controversy was in Washington and there was no showing by the de-
fendant that any property existed in Minnesota which could respond
to a judgment there. In all of this, while the court was directly con-
cerned with the lack or presence of jurisdiction, its language was not
that of the superior courts having to take jurisdiction, but rather
whether jurisdiction should be taken under the circumstances. The
court did exactly what is done in applying the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, namely, balancing the factors involved to determine which
was the more convenient and appropriate forum. The conclusion was
not that the courts of Washington had to take jurisdiction, but rather
that since no great burden would be imposed by trying the cause here,
there was no justification for denying the aid of the Washington courts
to the plaintiffs.
It has been suggested that the refusal of courts to try suits for tres-
pass to land when the land is located in another state is a part of the
doctrine. The refusal is upon the ground that the matter can be better
tried elsewhere and not that there is a lack of jurisdiction." Under
this analysis the Washington court has adopted the doctrine in indi-
cating that it will not entertain such an action for trespass.1
It has also been suggested that the rule that a court will not ordinar-
ily interfere with the internal management of foreign corporations is
10 STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 169 n. 98 (2d ed. 1951). See RE-
STATEMIENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 117i and 117j, (Tent Draft No. 4, 1957).
11 See Olympia Mining & Milling Co. v. Kerns, supra note 5.
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a part of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 2 In applying this
principle, the language used by the Washington court has been that of
lack of jurisdiction.3 However, it would seem that jurisdiction actually
existed but that the court was declining to exercise it."
Even ignoring the trespass to land and "internal affairs" cases, how-
ever, there have been the other aforementioned cases recognizing the
existence of discretion to decline jurisdiction. Though the label has not
been attached, it is submitted that in fact these cases represent an
application of forum non conveniens.
It should be noted that the Lansverk case places Washington in the
minority, as was recognized by the court. The federal courts, of course,
may exercise discretion and decline jurisdiction." In addition, most
states presented with the problem have adopted the doctrine as indi-
cated by the addendum to the Lansverk case."8 Others have recognized
the doctrine without having yet applied it.'7 Some have indicated that
the doctrine will be accepted when a proper case arises."
In view of the fact that Washington rejected the doctrine, particular
attention should be given to the other states which have done so and
12 STU.aan, supra note 10. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) CONFIcT OF LAWS § 117e,
comment d (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957).
"3 Meade v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 21 Wn.2d 866, 153 P.2d 686 (1944);
Fuller v. Ostruski, 48 Wn.2d 802, 296 P.2d 996 (1956).
14 SeCHEATHAm, GOODRICH, Giuswoin & REEsE, CASES & MEILS ON CON-
PLICT OiF LAWS 225 (4th ed. 1957) and cases cited therein; EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF
LAws 133 (1959).
' Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947) ; Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) ; 28 U. S. C. § 1404(a).
16 Arkansas: Running v. Southwest Freight Lines, 227 Ark 839, 303 S.W.2d 578
(1957); California: Price v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 42 Cal.2d 577, 268 P.2d 457
(1954) ; Illinois: Whitney v. Madden, 400 Ill. 185, 79 N.E.2d 593 (1948) ; Louisiana:
Union City Transfer v. Fields, 199 So. 206 (La. App. 1940) ; Maine: Foss v. Richards,
126 Me. 419, 139 Atl. 313 (1927) ; Massachusetts: Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Mid-
land Bank, Ltd., 281 Mass. 303, 184 N.E. 152 (1933); Minnesota: Johnson v. Chi-
cago, B. & Q. R.R., 243 Minn. 58, 66 N.W.2d 763 (1954); Missouri: L ftus v. Lee, 308
S.W.2d 654 (1958) ; New Hampshire: Jackson & Sons v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co.,
86 N.H. 341, 168 Atl. 895 (1933) ; New Jersey: Starr v. Berry, 25 N.J. 573, 138 A.2d
45 (1958) ; New York: De La Bouillerie v. De Vienne, 300 N.Y. 60, 89 N.E.2d 15
(1949); Oklahoma: St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Superior Court, 290 P.2d 118
(1955).
'7 District of Columbia: Rice v. Salnier, 86 A.2d 175 (D. C. Mun. App. 1952);
Florida: Hagen v. Viney, 124 Fla. 747, 169 So. 391 (1936) ; Utah: Mooney v. Denver
& R. G. W. R. R., 118 Utah 307, 221 P.2d 628 (1950).8 Indiana: Hartunion v. Wolflick, 125 Ind. App. 98, 122 N.E.2d. 622 (1954);
Iowa: Bradbury v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 149 Iowa 51, 128 N.W.1 (1910) ; Missis-
sippi: Strickland v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 194 Miss. 194, 11 So.2d 820 (1943),
and Tri-State Transit Co. v. Mondy, 194 Miss. 714, 12 So.2d 920 (1943); Oregon:
Homer v. Pleasant Creek Mining Corp., 165 Ore. 683, 107 P.2d 989 (1940) ; Vermont:
Morisette v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 76 Vt. 267, 56 Atl. 1102 (1904), and Wellman v.
Mead, 93 Vt. 322, 107 At. 396 (1919).
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the reasons therefor. Three states-Alabama," Ohio,2" and Texas2 - -
have rejected the doctrine because a statute so required. The Alabama
court indicated that it would prefer to apply the doctrine to avoid the
added burdens upon the court and the added expense and inconvenience
of hearing out of state controversies between outsiders, but the statute
precluded this. It is to be noted that while the Washington court in the
Lansverk case referred to the fact that jurisdiction was present under
the constitution and statutes of this state, the decision was not based
upon the controlling effect of the constitution or any statute, but rather
on more general policy considerations.
In the other states that have apparently rejected the doctrine, the
cases were usually decided at a comparatively early date and were
based entirely or in part on the theory that the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of Article 4, section 2 of the Federal Constitution required
that result." It has been made clear by United States Supreme Court,
however, that the clause does not preclude adoption of the doctrine so
long as differentiation is on the basis of residence and not citizenship."
One other state listed by the Washington court in the addendum to
the Lansverk case as rejecting the doctrine no longer fits that category.
While the Missouri court had earlier held in a Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act case that since Missouri allowed its citizens to maintain suits
it must likewise allow suits by non-citizens," recently the court has
concluded that the doctrine of forum non conveniens does apply to
other than F.E.L.A. cases.
It is interesting to note that in addition to Missouri, two other states,
19 State ex rel. Southern Ry., 254 Ala. 10, 47 So.2d 249 (1950).
20 Mattone v. Argentina, 123 Ohio St. 393, 175 N.E. 603 (1931).21 Allen v. Bass, 47 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
22 Michigan: Cofrode v. Gartner, 79 Mich. 332, 44 N.W. 623 (1890), with which
compare Gober v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 255 Mich. 20, 237 N.W. 32 (1931) ; Nebraska:
Herrmann v. Franklin Ice Cream Co., 114 Neb. 468, 208 N.W. 141 (1926); North
Carolina: McDonald v. MacArthur Bros. Co., 154 N.C. 122, 69 S.E. 832 (1910);
Wisconsin: Bourestom v. Bourestom, 231 Wis. 666, 285 N.W. 426 (1939) ; Virginia:
Morgan v. Pennsylvania Ry., 148 Va. 272, 138 S.E. 566 (1927).
In two recent cases in southern states it was held that there was no discretion to
decline jurisdiction where the plaintiff was a resident of the state wherein suit was
initiated. This left open the question whether the doctrine would be applied if both
parties were nonresident and the cause of action was foreign. Atlantic Coast Line
R. R. v. Wiggins, 77 Ga. App. 756, 49 S.E.2d 909 (1948) ; Chapman v. Southern Ry.,
230 S.C. 210, 95 S.E.2d 170 (1956).
23 Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. Ry., 279 U.S. 377 (1929). See Leon, Equity:
Availability in California of the Doctrine of Forun Non Conveniens as a Ground
for Refusal to Exercise Jurisdiction, 1 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 602 (1954), and Comment,
Forum Non Conveniens, A New Federal Doctrine, 56 YALE L. J. 1234 (1947).
24 State ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 362 Mo. 101, 240 S.W.2d 106 (1951).
25 Loftus v. Lee, supra note 16.
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California" and Minnesota," which earlier rejected the doctrine, have
more recently adopted it. While the original Restatement of Conflict
of Laws recognized the doctrine only as to certain matters dealing with
the internal affairs of foreign corporations,2" the second Restatement
adopts it more generally.29 As one leading commentator has stated,
the modern trend is toward general acceptance of the rule of forum
non conveniens in some form."0
It is true that nothing compels a state to adopt the doctrine and that
jurisdiction may be exercised despite the fact that it is an inappropriate
forum. 1 Assuming a state has acquired jurisdiction, it may reject or
accept the doctrine for all causes begun in its courts.82 Still, with the
considerable general authority favoring the doctrine, plus the earlier
indications in this state that the doctrine was part of the law of Wash-
ington, one reasonably could have expected its acceptance in the Lans-
verk case. Why then was it rejected?
While the few other states rejecting it have done so primarily on
the basis of explicit statutes or the privileges and immunities clause,
the Washington determination was a policy decision. This necessitates
an analysis of the policy issues involved.
In aligning itself with the minority, the court concluded that the
doctrine created more problems than it solved. In the first place, it
was stated that the Washington courts have not been confronted much
with plaintiffs shopping for a forum in order to vex and harass a de-
fendant so as to force him to settle at a high price. While this may have
been true in the past, one may question whether the complete rejection
of the doctrine will not encourage plaintiffs to seek relief in the courts
of this state since they now know that the superior courts do not have
the discretionary power embodied in the doctrine. In short, may not
the holding of the case encourage the very thing that the court says
does not now exist to any great extent, namely, forum shopping by
the plaintiffs in Washington? Is this not particularly likely since most
other states have adopted or indicated they will adopt the doctrine?
Further, with the enactment by the last legislature of chapter 131,
Session Laws of 1959, one may expect a greater number of plaintiffs
2 6 Price v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., supra note 16.
27 Johnson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., supra note 16.
28 See GooDRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CoNFLIcT OF LAWS 23, n. 49 (3d ed., 1949).
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLicT OF LAWS § 117e (Tent Draft No. 4, 1957).
30 LEFLAR, THE LAW OF ComNLicT OF LAWS 88 (1959).3 1 RESTATEMENT (SECoND), CoNFLicT OF LAWS § 117e, comment g (Tent. Draft No.
4, 1957).8 2 Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
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to seek relief in this state. That statute3 expands the in personam
jurisdiction of the courts of this state to the limits permitted under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4 In Illinois,
which has a similar statute, it has been suggested that in instances
where jurisdiction exists under the statute but the exercise of such
jurisdiction would be unduly burdensome upon the defendant or the
administration of justice, there could be dismissal under the doctrine."
This is not possible in Washington, however, in view of the Lansverk
case.
Moreover, under the new statute, a nonresident defendant will in
many instances be able to obtain removal of the cause to a federal
district court in this state." After such removal, a motion will lie in
some situations to transfer the cause to a more convenient federal
district." While this may provide an avenue of escape from an incon-
venient forum in some instances, would it not be better to make avail-
able to the defendant the possibility of successfully presenting his
motion to the state court rather than taking the step of removing to
the federal court and then making the very same motion? On the other
hand, a plaintiff confronted with the possibility of initiating an action
in either the state or federal court will certainly be encouraged to sue
in the former, where the doctrine is not available, with the hope that
the defendant will not seek removal to the federal court. Even if such
removal is sought, the end result will be that the state courts are likely
to be burdened with more litigation than has been true in the past and
that instead of sharing the trial of transitory causes of action with the
federal courts, the state courts will become at least the initial repository
for such causes of action. 8
The court in the Lansverk case continued that since forum shopping
by plaintiffs was rare it would not adopt the "drastic remedy of dis-
missal." However, adoption of the doctrine would not require that the
remedy be one of unconditional dismissal. It is true that a state court
33 By section 2, chapter 131, Session Laws of 1959, a person is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of Washington as to any cause of action
rising from (a) the transaction of any business within this state, (b) the commission
of a tortious act within this state, (c) the ownership, use, or possession of any
property whether real or personal, situated in this state, or (d) contracting to insure
any person, property or risk located within this state at the time of contracting.
34 See discussion of the statute by Trautman, In Personam Jurisdiction Expanded-
Force and Effect of Service of Process Outside of State, 34 WAsH. L. REv. 323 (1959).
35 See discussion in 110 ILL. ANN. STAT. § 17, at 170.
86 62 STAT. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1952).
3762 STAT. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952).
38 See Johnson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., supra note 16, where this factor was con-
sidered by the Minnesota court in relation to Federal Employers' Liability Act cases.
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could not transfer the case to a court of another state, whereas under
the federal statute there can be transfer from one district or division
to another. But a dismissal could be made conditional in requiring that
the defendant consent to the jurisdiction of the more convenient forum
or stipulate not to plead a statute of limitations or submit to any other
condition which the court might feel necessary to do justice to both
parties. 9 Or, instead of dismissing, a court might simply stay the pro-
ceedings to await the defendant's further actions elsewhere and to
assure itself that the plaintiff was able to obtain relief elsewhere."
Under the doctrine there are readily available alternatives to the "dras-
tic remedy" of which the court speaks.
The court went on to say that the application of the doctrine would
replace certainty as to forum with confusion and a variety of holdings
on almost identical facts. That the exercise of discretion by different
trial courts in balancing the relative conveniences and inconveniences
would result in differences of opinion cannot be denied. But this is
nothing new. In ruling on motions for trial amendments to the plead-
ings, for continuances, for inspection by the jury of premises, for
special verdicts and special interrogatories, and for many motions for
new trials, to name only a few, the superior court judges exercise their
discretion. In each instance a variety of holdings on almost identical
facts may be expected which may vitally affect the ultimate outcome,
but it is felt the trial courts must be allowed to consider the circum-
stances and equities of the particular issue in the particular case. If
the superior court judges are capable of exercising their discretion in
these other situations without creating excess confusion, it seems that
the same would be true in this instance. Certainly the supreme court
could still check any abuse of discretion by a superior court.
The court spoke also of the chaos and confusion resulting from the
almost invariable practice of railroads and other corporations doing
business in many states, of moving for dismissal upon the grounds of
forum non conveniens and of the flood of affidavits, counter-affidavits,
and testimony which might precede the trial court's ruling on the mo-
tion. While such corporations have usually been the defendants in
forum non conveniens cases in the past, with the expansion of in perso-
num jurisdiction which is present the trend as exemplified by the afore-
mentioned chapter 131, Session Laws of 1959, one may expect more
39 See Wendel v. Hoffman, 259 App. Div. 732, 18 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1940), for an
example of such a conditional dismissal.
40 See cases cited in C1FATHAm, GOODRICH, GRISWOLD AND REESE, CASES & MATEMI-
ALS ON Coxm.icr oF LAws 218 4th ed., 1957).
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and more private persons to be in the position of defendants needing
the benefits and protection of the doctrine. As to the affidavits and
testimony, the superior court judges could by appropriate rulings keep
these reasonable in scope and number without unduly burdening such
courts just as may be done, for example, in summary judgment pro-
ceedings. 1
So far as the court's concern with the likelihood that defendants will
invariably submit motions seeking to invoke the doctrine, this serves to
raise what this commentator believes is the most convincing argument
against the doctrine, namely, the potential delaying tactics which are
made available to the defendant. However, the making of such motions
and the time necessary for their consideration and determination would
not create any more of a problem than any of the other pre-trial mo-
tions which a defendant might make, such as for continuances, judg-
ments on the pleadings or summary judgments. Also, the superior
courts have the power to keep any motions invoking the doctrine
within bounds.
A more difficult problem so far as potential delay is concerned is
created by the appeal possibilities. But, even as to this, the problem
is not peculiar. If in exercising its discretion the superior court dis-
missed the action, the plaintiff could appeal since the dismissal would
be a final order. In most instances, it is submitted, the trial courts'
determination would be sustained as there is no reason to believe that
the superior courts would be more apt to abuse their discretion in rul-
ing on forum non conveniens motions than on any other pre-trial mo-
tions invoking the courts' discretion.
But what if the trial court, after exercising its discretion, denied the
motion? As is pointed out in the Lansverk case, the defendant would
have no immediate appeal since an order refusing to dismiss would not
be an appealable order." However, concern was expressed that the
defendants would find a means to secure a review by the use of certi-
orari or some other extraordinary writ.
Under the doctrine, just as the superior courts have the power to
keep motions for dismissal within bounds at the trial court level, it
41 WASH. RULES, PLEADING, PRACTICE, PROCEDURE 56.
4 2 WASH. RULES, APPEAL 14.
43 The court further stated that unless the defendant could devise some means of
securing a review by a special writ, an appeal after trial raising the issue that the
trial court erred in denying the motion would usually be of little avail. A reversal
would be unlikely because of the time and expense already devoted to the case. This




would seem that likewise the supreme court could regulate any review
proceedings initiated by the defendant so as to prevent abuse. Assum-
ing that the particular writ was found to be appropriate for the relief
sought by the defendant, if the supreme court concluded that the de-
fendant was acting in bad faith for the purpose of delay, costs or dam-
ages could be awarded so as to tend to prevent such actions in the
future. Certainly there are many other instances in which a defendant
may seek delay by means of a special writ or by means of a super-
sedeas bond, and if the court can adequately protect the plaintiff in
other instances, it can do the same here. 4 On the other hand, if the
defendant was found to be acting in good faith in seeking to prevent
an inappropriate and inconvenient court from hearing the case, he
should be entitled to so act. After all, the plaintiff may likewise be
acting in bad faith in initiating the action in the courts of this state
in the first place.
Up to this point attention has been directed towards the court's criti-
cisms of the doctrine. What, on the other hand, would be the advantages
resulting from its adoption?
Probably as good a summation of the doctrine and its purposes as
may be found is in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.45 As is there pointed out
by the United States Supreme Court, jurisdiction and venue statutes
are commonly drafted with considerable generality so as to assure a
plaintiff of a forum in which he can secure relief. The result is that a
plaintiff can use such statutes not only to obtain his just remedy but
to harass a defendant by initiating an action at a place inconvenient to
the defendant. The plaintiff's choice may have as its purpose, among
others, to force the defendant into an unwilling settlement, to obtain
higher damages than those available at a more convenient forum or
to take advantage of procedures most favorable to the plaintiff.
Many states, including Washington,"6 have recognized the general
problem by providing for change of venue to other courts within the
state for the convenience of witnesses or to promote the ends of justice.
If a state, such as Washington, recognizes the discretionary power of
its trial courts to transfer actions from one part of the state to another,
it is difficult to see why it should not recognize a comparable discretion-
ary power in its trial courts to refuse to hear transitory causes of action
which may be better tried in some other available state. To the sugges-
44 See WAsH. RurLEs, APPEA. 62.
45 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
40 RCW 4.12.030 (3).
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tion of the court in the Lansverk case that there is no power to transfer
but only to dismiss in the latter instance, one may point to the possi-
bility of using conditional dismissals or stays of proceedings.
In determining whether jurisdiction should be declined, two major
interests have been considered by the courts which have adopted the
doctrine, the private interests of the litigants and the public interest.
Included in the former category are such considerations as the residence
of the parties; the financial ability to defend at the selected forum;
the cost of transporting willing witnesses, records and other exhibits;
the availability of compulsory process for obtaining unwilling witnesses
and the possibility that depositions may have to be used instead of oral
testimony; the need of viewing premises; the possibilities of consoli-
dating actions at one forum; the feasibility of enforcing a judgment if
one is obtained.
Factors of public interest to be considered are the expense to local
taxpayers of maintaining judicial machinery for foreign causes of
action, the possibility of overcrowding dockets so that local litigants
cannot secure expeditious trials, and the loss of time to local citizens
in serving as jurors. There is the additional factor that as more and
more states join the federal courts in adopting the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, those states not adopting it will receive more of the
cases which the doctrine is designed to prevent. Also to be considered
is the difficulty confronting a court of applying a foreign law and
adapting an appropriate remedy. In other words, if the cause of action
arose elsewhere between nonresidents, it is not only difficult to obtain
the facts, but also to determine and apply the appropriate law."
Another aspect of the public interest relates to the question of who
ultimately will bear the cost of an action by a plaintiff in an inconveni-
ent forum. To the extent that defendants are railroads or other corpor-
ations engaging in interstate business, any costs imposed upon them
will likely be passed on to the public in the form of higher prices. The
public will benefit from an economic standpoint if plaintiffs in such
instances are referred to the most convenient forum.4
With the many factors to be considered in determining whether to
decline jurisdiction, uncertainties as to results would be present, as
47 This is not meant to suggest that jurisdiction should be declined for the conveni-
ence of the individual judge as contrasted with the convenience to the public interest
and courts in general. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
48 This consideration is developed in Note, New Limitations on Choice of Federal
Forum, 15 U. CHr. L. REv. 332 (1948).
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emphasized by the court in the Lansverk case. It is to be expected,
however, that precedents would develop to remove some uncertainties.
To the extent that this would not be true one may question whether
some uncertainty is not preferable to a rigid rule requiring courts
always to assume jurisdiction if the pertinent statutes are complied
with. With the uncertainty would also come the advantage of the courts
being able to adapt the exercise of their jurisdiction to the requirements
and equities of the particular case rather than a carte blanche accept-
ance of jurisdiction regardless of the inconveniences to the public and
the litigants.
It is constantly to be kept in mind that adoption of the doctrine
would not mean that the trial courts would automatically reject hearing
a suit because it involved a foreign cause of action or foreign parties
or both. It would mean only that discretion could be exercised consid-
ering the circumstances of the particular case. As has been said by
the United States Supreme Court, " . . . experience has not shown a
judicial tendency to renounce one's own jurisdiction so strong as to
result in many abuses."49 Such discretion would not be unlimited.
Before a court could decline jurisdiction it would have to be established
that there was another forum in which the defendant was amenable
to process.5 0 Further, the defendant would have the burden of proving
that jurisdiction should be declined, with all doubts resolved in the
plaintiff's favor. But if that burden were sustained and it were estab-
lished that there was a more convenient and more appropriate forum,
the trial court should have the power to act accordingly. As one com-
mentator has stated," ... recalling the public trust placed in the bench,
it does not seem too dangerous a step to permit a trial judge to turn
away a suitor who has tried to tip the scales of justice by selecting a
court with a view to harassing his opponent."'
Is one to conclude from the Lansverk opinion that a defendant here-
after will be completely unprotected against a plaintiff who initiates
his action in Washington for the purpose, for example, of harassing
the defendant into a large settlement? There is, of course, the possi-
49 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra note 44.
Strial court's discretion could be further limited by requiring that the defend-
ant be amenable to process in the other state at the time of the initiation of the suit in
Washington. In Hill v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., 252 Minn. 165, 89 N.W.2d
654 (1958), it was held that the trial court could not apply the doctrine upon the de-
fendant's offer to submit to the more convenient forum, where Minnesota was the only
state in which the plaintiff could obtain involuntary service of process at the time of
initiation of the action.




bility that the case might be overruled. California 2 and Minnesota, "
which originally rejected the doctrine, have since adopted it. And more
recently, as has been mentioned, Missouri, which had rejected the doc-
trine for Federal Employers' Liability Act cases, has adopted it for
other cases."
It is also possible in view of certain language in the Lansverk opinion
that practically the same results will be reached in Washington as are
reached in those states which apply the doctrine. The court stated, "If
we were confronted with a manifest abuse of process, we would not
need to rely upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens to deal with
the situation, and that also would be true if the relief sought offended
against the public policy of this state.""5
It is not certain what the court meant by this statement. Perhaps if
it were clear that there was no reasonable relation of the cause of
action or the parties to Washington and that the purpose of the plain-
tiff was to take unfair advantage of the defendant or unduly impose
upon the courts of this state, there would be a manifest abuse of process
and dismissal would be proper. Perhaps such an action would be con-
trary to the public policy of the state and dismissal could be ordered
in the trial court's discretion.
Taking the facts of the Lansverk case, that the plaintiffs were resi-
dents of North Dakota, that the defendants were not subject to suit
there and would not voluntarily submit to process there, and that the
plaintiffs' son, who represented them, lived in Washington, the Wash-
ington court could conclude that there was no manifest abuse of process
nor any offending of the public policy of this state in initiating an
action here. Likewise, those courts applying the doctrine of forum non
conveniens could in similar circumstances conclude that the defendant
had not sustained the burden of showing that the considerations de-
cisively favored a dismissal. Perhaps then the results in Washington
will in the future accord with the results in those states applying the
doctrine, with the difference being that our courts will talk in terms of
"manifest abuse of process" and public policy rather than forum non
conveniens.
On the other hand, to use the public policy concept in this sense
would not accord with its ordinary usage in conflict of laws cases. In
52 Price v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., mipra note 16.5
3 Johnson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., supra note 16.
54 Loftus v. Lee, supra note 16.
55 Lansverk v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., supra note 1, at 751 (1959).
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declining to hear a case on public policy grounds, substantive law mat-
ters rather than the conveniences of litigants and courts are the typical
governing considerations." Presumably that is what the Washington
court had in mind."Y
Similarly, in speaking of "manifest abuse of process" the court pre-
sumably had reference to something other than forum non conveniens.
In the court's view it apparently will take a greater showing of some
sort by the defendant to establish a manifest abuse of process. Other-
wise, the court would have simply adopted the doctrine and would not
have spoken in terms of not needing to rely upon it in such situations.
If the case cannot be interpreted to give the trial courts the discre-
tion embodied in the doctrine and if the case is not to be overruled,
how then are the benefits of the doctrine to be made available to liti-
gants and the public of the state? The court stated that if the doctrine
is to be adopted it must be by rule or statute."
56 See GOODRICH, HAND r OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 (3d ed. 1949) ; S um-
BERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAws, 168-171 (2d ed. 1951); LEFLAR, THE LAw
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 48 (1959).
57 Richardson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 11 Wn2d 288, 118 P2d 985 (1941),
speaks of public policy as relating to substantive law matters.58 The following draft is proposed for consideration. This draft is adapted from
Senate Bill No. 1960 which was passed by the 1953 session of the California legislature,
but which failed to obtain gubernatorial approval.
1. The superior courts may dismiss an action upon motion of the defendant
made at or before the time of answering, when it appears from affidavits or other-
wise [that the cause of action did not arise within this state, and that at the time
the cause of action arose the plaintiff was not a resident of- this state, and] that a
court of this state is not a convenient forum for the parties and witnesses and that
the dismissal of the action will serve the interests of justice. If the court deter-
mines to grant the motion, it shall make an interlocutory order which shall impose
such conditions as the court in its discretion deems just and reasonable, but, in
any event, such interlocutory order shall require that there be filed in the action
a written agreement executed by the moving defendant and such other defendants
as the court shall determine, which agreement as to each defendant shall contain:
(a) Such stipulations as may be necessary to provide effectively that the plain-
tiff may bring and maintain an action upon the cause of action in such jurisdiction
or jurisdictions as the court shall determine or, if such action cannot be brought
and maintained in any such jurisdiction, that the interlocutory order and any final
dismissal shall be vacated and that the time within which the action must be
brought to trial shall commence on the date when the interlocutory order or dis-
missal is so vacated; and
(b) Such stipulations as may be necessary to suspend effectively all statutes of
limitations which have not expired at the time the action was commenced for a
period sufficient to make effective the provisions of the foregoing subdivision (a)
which period shall be not less than 180 days after the dismissal shall become
final; and(c) Such stipulations as may be necessary to assure that the moving defendant,
and such other defendants as the court shall determine, will voluntarily make a
general appearance in, or be subject to the process of a court in the jurisdiction or
jurisdictions determined by the court as provided in subdivision (a).
2. Upon proof that the conditions of the interlocutory order have been per-
formed within the time allowed, the court, upon motion, shall thereupon enter ajudgment of dismissal. If the conditions are not performed, the court, upon motion,
shall vacate the interlocutory order and enter an order denying the motion or make
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It is submitted that action should be taken to fill the vacuum in the
law of this state left by the Lansverk case. Preferably this should be
done by the supreme court under its rule-making powers. To await
action by the legislature would mean a considerable lapse of time plus
the uncertainty of steering a bill through the legislative channels. Ac-
tion is needed to prevent plaintiffs, to the detriment of defendants and
the public, from seeking relief in the courts of this state when there is
a more convenient and appropriate forum elsewhere. As the supreme
court of Missouri has recently said in adopting forum non conveniens,
"We deem it also clear that the nondelegable duty inherently and pri-
marily rests upon the courts to prevent abuse of their process, inde-
pendently of the legislature."5
such other order as is just. An interlocutory order hereunder is an appealable
order.
3. The party making the motion shall have the burden of proof [that the cause
of action did not arise within this state,] that a court of this state is not a con-
venient forum for the parties and witnesses and that dismissal will serve the inter-
ests of justice.
4. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the superior court at any time that any
motions or affidavits presented pursuant to this [rule] [statute] are presented in
bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the
party employing them to pay the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses
which the filing of the motions or affidavits caused him to incur, including reason-
able attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty
of contempt.
5. If the supreme court is satisfied by the record that any appellate proceedings
involving an interlocutory order or a final judgment of dismissal under this [rule]
[statute] were taken for delay only, the court may award such damages as will
effectually tend to prevent the taking of such proceedings for delay only.
The first two sections of the above proposal would provide the superior courts with
the power to condition any dismissal according to the circumstances of the particular
case, thereby protecting the interests of the plaintiff, defendant, and the public. The
bracketed language could be included or excluded depending upon the scope of dis-
cretion which is deemed desirable to repose in the superior courts. Section three would
place the burden of proof upon the defendant. It could be further detailed as to the
degree of proof required, if that were deemed necessary. Sections four (adapted from
Washington Rules, Pleading, Practice & Procedure 56(g)) and five (adapted from
Washington Rules on Appeal 62) would seem to provide adequate assurance that
either the superior courts or the supreme court could act to prevent the delaying
tactics by defendants foreseen by the court in the Lansverk case.
51 Loftus v. Lee, supra note 16.
[VOL. 35
